Since I’ve returned from Gulu, the murky realities of the
current DR Congo crisis have expanded and more actors have reportedly become
involved. M23, a rebel group comprised of Tutsi Congolese fighters with
logistical and material backing provided by Rwanda (allegedly, of course), have refused to leave Goma
until their demands have been met. Among these demands are a release of all
political prisoners, dissolution of the
electoral commission enacted by DR Congo’s President Kabila, and the withdraw
of the FDLR from their current positions throughout the region. None of these demands will be easily met, even if they were agreed upon, which is unlikely. This morning,
Rwanda accused FDLR troops of entering its country from positions in Eastern DR
Congo and attacking numerous villages before being chased away by Rwanda’s army,
the RDF. FDLR’s spokesman has refuted the accusation and at present there are
no independent reports.
The thing that scares me
the most in high tension, pre-conflict situations (I use this to reference a
direct military confrontation between Rwanda and DR Congo, as one could easily
argue that Rwanda’s support of M23 is tantamount to cross-border warfare) is
the emergence of an excuse. Last week reports emerged that the Congolese
military, the FARDC, shelled positions along its border with Rwanda, although
there was no escalation of conflict from Kigali. Then again, there didn’t need
to be with M23 sleeping comfortably across the border. This time I’m not so
sure Kagame will allow FARDC incursions into his territory, if there even were
cross-border raids by the Hutu rebels. It wouldn’t be the first time he’s used FARDC
activities as an excuse for wider conflict escalation.
The conflict in DR Congo
is easily one of the most, if not the most,
complicated, devastating and under-reported conflicts in the world. The size,
scope and duration of the conflict are hard to wrap your head around at the
most elementary of levels. Take into consideration Belgian colonialism, the Cold
War involvement of the United States and Belgium in Patrice Lumumba’s
assassination, the sheer amount of state and non-state actors involved since
1996 as well as their roles and ambitions in the conflict (if they have any at
all besides general anarchy), the implications of conflict on mineral and
resource trading, and the devastating human toll of the conflict, and you still
barely scratch the surface.
And here we go again, as it seems.
As of present, the FARDC’s
spokesperson has stated that M23’s refusal to leave Goma is an act of war, and
they will respond in kind. I highly doubt the FARDC - an incredibly inept
fighting force that suffered one of its most embarrassing defeats when a rebel
group less than a year old took Goma without firing a shot – will launch an
incursion into Goma, especially given the amount of soldiers and policemen who
have defected to M23 since they took Goma. The situation is so fluid, however,
that from time I finish writing this to the time I’ve finished posting it,
everything could change.
Hopefully, Kagame doesn’t
have his excuse yet, or at least doesn’t use it.
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ReplyDeleteHey Cory, you raise some interesting points and highlight some concerns ...have you read the Rift Valley Institute's newly released reports:
ReplyDelete"From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in the Eastern Congo"
or
"North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of the Eastern Congo"
Worth checking out.
Notwithstanding, how do you factor in Rwanda [read Kagame as you've emphasized] now having a seat on the UN security council as a factor or pressure upon future action? Moreover, keeping in mind the aid cuts which followed Uganda's unfolding OPM corruption scandal, are there deterrents which would prevent Rwanda from making public and bold military moves as you have here suggested?
I haven't read them, but thanks for the suggestions, hopefully I'll have time to check them out this weekend. It's funny, I was joking the other day with somebody on what the shortest time a member state has been voted in to the UNSC and then had their membership revoked. Of course Rwanda can now water down proposed sanctions and has an influence over who can investigate the situation on the ground. I think it's also important to note that the alleged support was reported on before Rwanda was accepted, so it's not like this is entirely out of the blue.
ReplyDeleteIn terms of deterrents, it's hard to say. Military aid has been cut to Rwanda from Western nations, although it's more symbolic than practical. The international community's collective guilt over 1994 is still very real, and while that isn't to say that another war will won't be condemned, I think Kagame knows exactly what he can and can't get away with. Plus, unless MONUSCO's mandate is extended, who is going to stop them? That said, it looks like M23 are heading out of Goma to hear out negotiations. Kabila has no leverage and M23 knows it - if he negotiates, he recognizes M23 as a legitimate group with political ambitions and loses his power role in Kinshasa; if he doesn't, the rebels have "we tried" card in their back pocket should they decide to keep up their offensive.