I'm a few
hours away from traveling back to Gulu, the past epicenter of the conflict
between the Lord's Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda. This
time I'm traveling for recreation more than for work, a testament to how far
Gulu has come after being ground zero for thousands of night walking children
less than a decade ago. A large part of this transition is due to the huge
amounts of NGOs that flocked to Gulu following a cessation of hostilities, with
the influx of Westerners leading to a demand for high end grocery
stores, restaurants and hotels. The organization I work for -
the Refugee Law Project - has an office there, and hundreds of other
organizations, including Invisible Children, have offices as well. Hopefully
within the next few years there won't be any, although that would be
wishful, naive thinking.
I've made my thoughts on Invisible Children's advocacy efforts in the
United States more than audible since returning from my first trip from Uganda,
and especially following the release of the Kony2012 video. But as
the uproar around the video died down, so did my criticism. Even if the organization
pulls off something as half as successful as the video in the future, I'm sure
I'll still keep my voice down. I've hurt people I cared about in the
process of dissent, and while that isn't a reason to keep my opinions down, at
this point the group is irrelevant to my life, my work and my interests. The
more I work around the post-conflict recovery situation in northern Uganda, the
more I understand that there is no single good way to solve any one particular
issue. Focusing on the way not to solve an issue is, at
this point in my thinking, counterproductive.
That the uproar over the video is still going on is rather bemusing to me. I
just don't see the point. Sverker
Finnström's latest essay on the subject, "
KONY 2012,
Military Humanitarianism, and the Magic of Occult Economies", is
masterfully written, but it doesn't bring anything new to the discussion.
Finnström is an academic I highly admire;
his book Living With Bad
Surroundings is one of my favorites not only on northern Uganda, but as a piece of non-fiction as a whole.
Manuel Barcia, on the other hand, was unknown to me until today, when Al
Jazeera published his article, "Whatever
happened to Kony 2012?" Barcia's article is full of so many
blatant miscalculations and factual inaccuracies, it's hard to imagine that it passed through
the eyes of a single Al Jazeera editor.
The thesis of the article is
fair enough:
"The
failure to achieve what the Kony2012 filmmakers had aimed for -
capturing Joseph Kony and bringing him to justice - raises some important
questions about the effectiveness of foreign meddling in African affairs. It
equally warns us of the concealed dangers behind the export of "good
will" from the West towards other parts of the world. As the ancient
aphorism goes: The road to hell is paved with good intentions."
Again, it brings nothing new to the discussion and might seem
a bit overarching in its premise (that a video by idealistic
and incompetent foreigners is what finally raises these questions seems to give
too much credit, but I digress), but the the central idea isn't off-base. From
there, all illogical hell breaks loose.
Following his thesis, Barcia brings
us this bit of insight:
"Another enduring failure in the West is the underestimation
of the resourcefulness of African warlords. Only twenty years ago, US marines
were routed at the battle of Mogadishu by the men - both military and civilians
- loyal to Mohamed Farah Aidid, who at the time was terrorising the Somalian
capital and taking the lives of men, women and children for fun.
Unfortunately, and in spite of all our supposed Western superiority
and technological advantage, we have continued to make the same mistakes time
and again. Not even a Hollywood blockbuster like Black Hawk Down, where the errors of
the US military commanders were laid bare, has taught us anything."
I'm curious as to whether Barcia's
knowledge of US intervention into Somalia is based solely on the film, as if
the hell that Army Rangers faced that day - and the pre-conditions to
intervention, Western humanitarian blunders leading to
the Mogadishu raid, and basic misunderstanding of Somali
clan structures and loyalty - were perfectly captured on the screen by Josh
Hartnett and his men and they valiantly returned fire against a drugged up militia. The mission failed for
numerous reasons, and poor planning and lack of contingency options were two big ones. A body count of
21 US, Pakastani and Malaysian dead, compared to the estimated 3,000
Somali causalities, however, is not a route.
And in spite of our "superiority" and "technological advances", where has the
United States, in the continent of Africa, made the same mistake again? The
images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets
of Mogadishu had a direct impact on non-intervention during the Rwandan
genocide, a fact well known by Bagosora and realized in
the butchering of 10 Belgian soldiers; the West pulled out and the killing began unimpeded. American troops on
the ground on the continent haven't engaged in battle in over 20 years, perhaps
save the NATO Libyan air assault.
Finally, into the fray then, we have Joseph Kony. Barcia's recount of LRA
history (in one neat little paragraph!) is filled with the boring, often
inaccurate storyline of the LRA's beginnings. Religion here, child abductions
there, analysis or historical competence nowhere. We are then left with this
jaw dropping piece of insight, sure to shatter any semblance of requirements
that one must reach to enter the world of academia:
"Singling out Joseph Kony and making him
famous, as the Invisible Children filmmakers wanted, may have impeded Kony from
frightening his own people, the Achuli, but has hardly stopped him from
killing, raping, and kidnapping other peoples in South Sudan, the DRC, and the
Central African Republic, many of whom perhaps would have never been bothered
by Kony and his LRA had not been for the Kony2012 campaign that
forced him to withdraw from Uganda and go in search of new pastures."
Where, oh where, to begin? I
suppose with "frightening his own people", which is akin to
describing Saddam's treatment of the Kurds as "a bit spooky." No
mention of Museveni or the UPDF's actions toward the "Achuli" is
mentioned, which could be because Barcia is actually attempting to discuss the
"Acholi", but couldn't quite get that little bit of information
correctly spelled.
The rest of the sentence
is completely inaccurate; as in false, a lie, a complete
misunderstanding of not-too-distant past and current history. The LRA have not
operated inside northern Uganda since the 2006 Juba Peace Talks. Half the
reason there was such an uproar against the Kony2012 video was that it
portrayed events as if they were currently happening, but were in actuality
years old. How on earth an academic director at a major university attributes
the Kony2012 video to the dismissal of LRA outside of Uganda, an event that took place close to six years before the video was released, is beyond me.
The rest of the article focuses on
conflict-minerals and their fuel of warfare in Eastern DRC, as well as US
interests at stake that helps fuel the brutality. There is nothing nuanced or
overtly insightful, but the historical inaccuracies are kept to a minimum. Finally,
in closing, Barcia writes:
"The Kony2012 creators
have now a magnificent platform to expose and examine not just the story of a
religious nut mass murderer, but also some deeper issues that have contributed
for centuries to the spread of violence and bloodshed in Africa. We can only
hope they use it."
This conclusion directly follows
Barcia's (albeit correct) assertion that the film follows traditional
Western imaginings of an African hell, filled with conflict and
children in need of rescuing. The problem is that Barcia takes the same
route. By referring to Kony as a "religious nut mass murderer" it
sheds the same image that he pertains to disdain. There are no political or
economic motivations behind Kony and the LRA, just a madman killing because he
can.
Barcia had the platform to at the
least, get his information right. He couldn't use it.
